{"id":1388,"date":"2025-10-27T11:07:44","date_gmt":"2025-10-27T11:07:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/edi.lt\/?post_type=analysis&p=1388"},"modified":"2026-10-28T14:46:03","modified_gmt":"2026-10-28T14:46:03","slug":"moldovas-struggle-for-a-european-future-an-election-analysis","status":"publish","type":"analysis","link":"https:\/\/edi.lt\/en\/analizes-ir-komentarai\/analyses\/moldovas-struggle-for-a-european-future-an-election-analysis\/","title":{"rendered":"Moldova’s Struggle for a European Future: An Election Analysis"},"content":{"rendered":"

Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Election results.<\/strong> In Moldova’s parliamentary elections the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won the most votes with 50.2% (55 seats). The pro-Russian Patriotic Bloc (BEP) came second with 24.2% (26 seats). The new Alternative coalition (BA) won 7.96% (8 seats), Our Party (PN) 6.2% (6 seats) and the Democracy at Home party (PPDA) 5.62% (6 seats). The parliament has 101 seats in total.<\/li>\n
  2. PAS’s position and campaign strategy.<\/strong> The governing PAS, led by Igor Grosu and founded by President Maia Sandu, presented the campaign as a referendum on Moldova’s membership of the European Union. The party highlighted its economic and infrastructure achievements, its social support programmes and five strategic goals, including signing the EU accession treaty by 2028. PAS received its strongest support in the diaspora and in the capital, Chi\u0219in\u0103u.<\/li>\n
  3. BEP: the decline of the traditional pro-Russian left.<\/strong> The BEP bloc of Socialists and Communists kept second place but continues to lose support. BEP is backed mainly by pro-Russian, older, Russian speaking and Gagauz minority voters. Its campaign focused on dissatisfaction with PAS rule, claiming that the country was living under a “dictatorship” and would lose its traditional values with EU membership.<\/li>\n
  4. Alternative and Our Party: in search of a third way.<\/strong> The Alternative coalition, led by Chi\u0219in\u0103u mayor Ion Ceban, sought to establish itself as a technocratic force independent of the geopolitical confrontation. Our Party, led by Renato Usat\u00eei, used populist, regional and “Moldovan way” rhetoric, offering its own vision independent of the large blocs.<\/li>\n
  5. PPDA: an unexpected result.<\/strong> The far right Democracy at Home party (Vasile Costiuc), which advocates union between Moldova and Romania, was the surprise of the elections. However, its success is suspected to have been driven largely by a disinformation campaign and vote buying. An investigation is under way.<\/li>\n
  6. Hybrid threats and external influence.<\/strong> The elections were accompanied by coordinated disinformation, vote buying and cyber influence campaigns linked to Russian networks, including the oligarch Ilan Shor and the Storm-1516 group founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin. Artificial intelligence tools, deepfake videos and thousands of cloned accounts were used. Social media platforms responded sluggishly to the disinformation campaign.<\/li>\n
  7. Despite the scale of external interference and disinformation, Moldova’s institutions and civil society showed greater resilience<\/strong>. The election results reveal a clear direction chosen by society: to continue European integration and to strengthen the modernisation of the state and its democratic institutions.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
      \n
    1. Election results<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
      Party\/coalition<\/strong><\/td>\nVote share (change)<\/strong><\/td>\nSeats (change)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) (I. Grosu)<\/td>\n50.2% (\u22122.6)<\/td>\n55 (\u22128)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Patriotic Electoral Bloc coalition (BEP) (I. Dodon)<\/td>\n24.2% (\u22122.97)<\/td>\n26 (\u22126)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Alternative coalition (BA) (I. Ceban)<\/td>\n7.96% (new)<\/td>\n8 (new)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Our Party (PN) (R. Usat\u00eei)<\/td>\n6.2% (+2.1)<\/td>\n6 (+6)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
      Democracy at Home political party (PPDA) (V. Costiuc)<\/td>\n5.62% (+4.17)<\/td>\n6 (+6)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n
        \n
      1. The main contenders<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS)<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The party is led by the Speaker of Parliament, Igor Grosu, but its founder is President Maia Sandu, now serving her second term. PAS is the latest incarnation of the pro-European, anti-communist political forces of the past decade, whose roots can be traced to the Popular Front of Moldova (the counterpart of Lithuania’s S\u0105j\u016bdis) and the democratic movements that grew out of it, above all the Liberal Democratic and Liberal parties. PAS was founded in 2015 and 2016 at the height of a wave of anti-corruption, pro-European protests.<\/p>\n

        Electorate<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        Before the elections PAS polled between 35 and 48%. In the elections the party received 50.2% of the vote, only 2.6 points less than in 2021. PAS will hold 55 seats in Parliament (a majority of 4). PAS is most often chosen by younger, better educated voters, the diaspora and residents of the capital and the centre of the country. In Chi\u0219in\u0103u the party won 52.68% of the vote, and in some districts of the capital its support exceeded 60%. In the municipalities around Chi\u0219in\u0103u the party also won 50% or more. However, PAS’s biggest base is the diaspora, which makes up slightly more than 17% of the total electorate. In the diaspora PAS won 79% support. Diaspora votes account for as much as 27.5% of the PAS electorate. By comparison, Chi\u0219in\u0103u voters make up 24.6% of the PAS electorate, even though 100,000 more voters cast their ballots in Chi\u0219in\u0103u than in the diaspora.<\/p>\n

        Compared with the presidential election a year earlier and the support for Maia Sandu, PAS improved its percentage result in every geographical area in these elections: by 8 points in the Northern region, 7 points in the Central region, 7.5 points in the Southern region, 4.5 points in Transnistria and 8 points in the diaspora.<\/p>\n

        Campaign messages<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        PAS’s main campaign message: “Over the past four years Moldova has overcome many challenges, kept the peace and achieved the greatest economic progress in its history. Significant projects have been launched in every town and village, earning Moldova international respect. The country is now just one step away from membership of the European Union. It is a decisive vote that will confirm this direction. Vote for PAS on 28 September.”<\/em><\/p>\n

        Campaign slogans: “Defend the country’s European future!”, “Moldova, we respect you”<\/em><\/p>\n

        Programme highlights<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        In its campaign PAS placed the greatest emphasis on its achievements and on five strategic directions for the future. There was also a separate programme of planned work for the capital, Chi\u0219in\u0103u. In the list of achievements the main emphasis was on infrastructure, roads, the modernisation of the energy sector, hospital renovation and other physical works. A lot of attention was also given to the various support programmes for pensioners and low income residents.<\/p>\n

        PAS’s 5 commitments for the future:<\/p>\n

        “1. Sign the EU accession treaty by 2028, before the end of President Maia Sandu’s second term.<\/em><\/p>\n

        2. Double the incomes of the working population (private sector employees, teachers, doctors, police officers, freelancers and others).<\/em><\/p>\n

        3. Double the value of Moldovan goods and services exported around the world.<\/em><\/p>\n

        4. Build or repair up to 3,000 km of roads by 2029 so that the entire national and regional road network is in good condition.<\/em><\/p>\n

        5. Create a national programme to promote culture and traditions, funding events in the country and in the diaspora.”<\/em><\/p>\n

        Interestingly, alongside the five commitments the programme has a separate section on what would happen if the communists, the anti-European forces, returned. Some of the more notable points:<\/p>\n

        “European countries would no longer talk to politicians who support the war in Ukraine, are on sanctions lists, are banned from the Schengen area or have protested against the EU.”<\/em><\/p>\n

        “An oligarchic government would do the same as before: steal public money and support only its own and loyal companies.”<\/em><\/p>\n

        “An anti-European government would close European markets, and we would return to the times when Moldovan products were subject to the most brutal embargoes.”<\/em><\/p>\n

        “The politicians of the past want us divided and set against each other. That is why they will keep manipulating false questions about language and history and pay no attention to culture and traditions, because they do not care about our values. <..> They would hide the horrors of Stalinism and communism and continue to suppress our national identity, seeking to turn the country into a tool of the Kremlin that would weaken and divide Moldova even further.”<\/em><\/p>\n

        The campaign<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        PAS ran a campaign of contrasts, highlighting its achievements and concrete promises for the future while always stressing the danger of returning to the past, when the Communists and Socialists were in power. Most of the campaign was fairly positive and focused on its record, but towards the finish, in order to mobilise the electorate, an element of negative campaigning against the other, pro-Russian forces appeared. The party tried to show that all the other forces (not only BEP) were pro-Russian and would halt EU membership. In the last weeks of the campaign it was especially emphasised that these elections were a kind of referendum on EU membership.<\/p>\n

        In terms of tools, the PAS campaign was fairly simple and classic. It relied on many face to face meetings with residents, door to door canvassing and a campaign newspaper. Compared with the presidential election a year earlier, when Maia Sandu’s campaign focused mainly on mobilising her strongest areas (the diaspora and the central region, Chi\u0219in\u0103u and its surroundings), this time the campaign was more balanced and covered the whole country. The party therefore ran separate geographical mini campaigns for each region and each municipality, trying to show its achievements and to promise concrete work everywhere.<\/p>\n

        On social media the focus was on the work done in each municipality. Many candidates on the list made simple homemade videos on their social media accounts about what PAS had done in their town.<\/p>\n

        Particular attention was paid to the diaspora, showing how actively it takes part in the elections and providing information about polling stations and more. PAS’s success in the diaspora can be linked to Maia Sandu personally: she herself comes from the diaspora and therefore has a close personal connection with Moldovans abroad. Throughout her term the President actively travelled to diaspora communities abroad, while PAS sought to build its own party structures there.<\/p>\n

        Patriotic Electoral Bloc coalition (BEP)<\/strong><\/p>\n

        BEP consists of four parties: the Socialists, the Communists, a Gagauz national minority party and the tiny pro-Russian Party of the Future of Moldova. The pro-Russian Communists of former President Vladimir Voronin were historically the dominant force on the left of Moldovan politics. The other three parties emerged over the last decade as younger leaders split from Voronin’s old Communists. The Party of Socialists of Moldova under Igor Dodon managed to win elections and power, but corruption scandals, incompetence and the clearly pro-European position of the larger part of society have reduced its support.<\/p>\n

        While until 2010 the Communists won more than 40%, and sometimes 50%, of the vote, over the past decade support for the Communists and Socialists has steadily fallen to less than a third. This shows a marked shift in public opinion. The last time this camp won a notable victory was the 2016 presidential election, when Dodon defeated Maia Sandu by five percentage points. That election, however, took place against the background of protests against the then pro-European governing coalition, which was embroiled in the biggest corruption scandal in the country’s history. Dodon’s victory can therefore be attributed more to public protest against the government than to genuine support for pro-Russian forces.<\/p>\n

        Electorate<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        Pre-election polls put BEP’s support at between 20 and 36%. The final result, 24.2%, was half that of PAS. BEP relies on pro-Russian voters, especially pensioners, former Soviet soldiers, Russian speaking voters (10% of Moldova’s population) and national minorities, above all the Gagauz. BEP did best in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the neighbouring municipalities, where the coalition won 79 to 82% of the vote. The bloc also performed strongly at the polling stations set up for voters from Transnistria, where it won over 50% (compared with 30% for PAS). BEP was also strongest in the municipalities of northern Moldova (B\u0103l\u021bi, Briceni, Dondu\u0219eni, Edine\u021b, Ocni\u021ba, R\u00ee\u0219cani), where the share of Russian speakers is two to three times higher than the national average (10%). In these municipalities, by comparison, PAS won between 20 and 35%. In the diaspora BEP won only 5%.<\/p>\n

        Campaign messages<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        BEP’s main campaign message: “You voted, but nothing changed. It is still hard. Everything in this country is the same. Enough. Our children deserve a future here, at home. We are coming! The time of the swindlers is over. The voice of the people is stronger than any government or dictatorship. There is one revolution. The money will come to the Republic of Moldova. On 27 September we go to vote. We believe in Moldova. We vote for the Patriotic Bloc.”<\/em><\/p>\n

        The campaign also made heavy use of narratives about religion and conservatism versus liberalism. It was claimed that the EU would no longer allow people to practise the Orthodox faith and would force them to accept liberal positions (on LGBTQ+ and the like). An inverted Soviet narrative was also used: it was claimed that the USSR had been a union in which people could freely practise their Orthodox faith, while the EU was a union that would ban religion.<\/p>\n

        Programme highlights<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        In its programme BEP emphasised building a social welfare state based on solidarity, justice and responsibility. The state must guarantee citizens’ right to work, education, health and a dignified life. BEP seeks to support an economy that attracts investment and creates new jobs. It particularly stressed that BEP would lower prices and obtain cheap gas from Moscow.<\/p>\n

        The bloc presents itself as a patriotic, conservative, social democratic force defending national interests. EU membership is described as not serving national interests, but no clear pro-Russian position is stated either. Still, the overall mood was clearly pro-Russian, and in more closed meetings with residents closer ties with Russia were strongly emphasised.<\/p>\n

        The campaign<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The campaign particularly stressed that nothing had changed in four years of PAS rule and that the PAS “regime is a dictatorship”. This emphasis on a supposed “dictatorship” was especially strong in the last weeks, when law enforcement agencies carried out searches and investigative actions over vote buying and, because of financing violations, barred the Gagauz minority party Heart of Moldova, led by the former governor of the autonomous region Irina Vlah, from taking part in the elections. This party was a member of BEP. In the wake of this event the bloc tried to portray BEP as a fortress besieged by the PAS dictatorship.<\/p>\n

        BEP’s campaign itself was fairly classic, using both face to face meetings and social media advertising. BEP stood out most for organising large street demonstrations with flags and big gatherings of party activists, as if to show that it was a numerous force supported by many different groups of people.<\/p>\n

        After losing the elections, BEP’s future does not look secure. There are marked tensions within the coalition, especially between older and younger leaders. Communist leader Vladimir Voronin is 84, so there is no doubt that these were his last elections. The Communists as a political force are likely to disappear from Moldovan politics when he steps down. In the Party of Socialists, which was formed when young leaders split from the Communists, there are tensions over Igor Dodon’s leadership and much dissatisfaction with his failure to win in recent years. Some believe that the future leader of the pro-Russian forces could be Irina Vlah, the former governor of Gagauzia, but she has been charged over vote buying and is under EU sanctions. This significantly limits her prospects. All this, together with the declining results of the pro-Russian Communist and Socialist bloc, raises questions about the bloc’s future.<\/p>\n

        Alternative coalition (BA)<\/strong><\/p>\n

        A coalition of three small parties brought together by former Communists or politicians linked to them. Its leaders are Chi\u0219in\u0103u mayor Ion Ceban, Alexandr Stoianoglo, the Socialist and Communist candidate in last year’s presidential election, and former Prime Minister Ion Chicu. The alliance positions itself as a third way, a technocratic alternative to both the pro-Russian left and the pro-European right. With this position it sought to attract disillusioned voters from both camps. The coalition declared itself pro-European and in favour of EU integration, while also wanting pragmatic, peaceful relations with Russia. It relies heavily on Ceban’s popularity (in 2023 he won the Chi\u0219in\u0103u mayoral election in the first round with the support of half of the voters).<\/p>\n

        Electorate<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        Before the elections support for the Alternative coalition ranged from 7 to 11%. The alliance won 7.96% of the vote and 8 seats in Parliament. BA received the most support in Chi\u0219in\u0103u, where it won between 11 and 17%. It also did fairly well in B\u0103l\u021bi, the second largest city (almost 11%), and in Gagauzia (12%). In the diaspora it won only 2%.<\/p>\n

        Campaign messages<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The campaign slogan was: “Every citizen deserves to live better”.<\/em><\/p>\n

        The campaign stressed that the coalition’s leader, Chi\u0219in\u0103u mayor Ion Ceban, had achieved a great deal in Chi\u0219in\u0103u despite obstruction by the central government, and that the same changes could reach the whole country. It was emphasised that the coalition’s programme was very concrete, realistic and non-populist, focused on the economy, education, health care and public safety. Citizens’ problems are not solved in the East or the West, they are solved here, in Moldova. The coalition also did not shy away from fairly sharp criticism of PAS, the President and the Government. It declared that a coalition with PAS was impossible.<\/p>\n

        The campaign<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The Alternative coalition drew a fairly clear third way, technocratic alternative between PAS and BEP. In this way it sought to attract voters disillusioned with both traditional blocs, especially in the capital.<\/p>\n

        The campaign made active use of the image, achievements and personality of Chi\u0219in\u0103u mayor Ion Ceban. The party used the usual range of tools. Particular attention was paid to distributing the coalition’s publication, especially in the regions, in order to show that the coalition reached further than the capital. Much attention was also given to presenting individual parts of the programme online with detailed infographics and statistics, to emphasise technocratic competence and expertise.<\/p>\n

        The coalition is likely to consolidate into a single party in the future. If BEP begins to disintegrate or conflicts between its leaders intensify, Alternative may try to establish itself as the main party opposing PAS. Ion Ceban’s role is also important here, as he is most likely planning to run in the 2028 presidential election. Setting up a political organisation is a natural step towards that goal.<\/p>\n

        Our Party (PN)<\/strong><\/p>\n

        The party of the oligarch Renato Usat\u00eei, former mayor of B\u0103l\u021bi, the second largest city. It is a typical populist, pro-Russian protest party that stresses the importance of strengthening the regions and local government. In the Lithuanian context the closest example is the Labour Party. In Moldova the party is considered pro-Russian because its leader held Russian citizenship until 2023, has historically advocated closer ties with the Kremlin, and some of his businesses are in Russia. Recently, however, Usat\u00eei has put more emphasis on the country following its own path, being more “Moldovan” and “rejecting the practice so far, in which Moldova is ruled for four years by pro-Russian political forces and then by pro-European ones”. This is a clear attempt to formulate a third way alternative and to cultivate a “Moldovan” identity with nostalgia for the Soviet era.<\/p>\n

        The party is not new. Both the party and its leader have been active in Moldovan politics for a decade, but the party has never achieved significant victories. Usat\u00eei ran twice in presidential elections and received 17% and 14% of the vote respectively, but this support did not transfer to the party, which used to win only 3 to 4% in parliamentary elections.<\/p>\n

        Although the leader’s pro-Russian stance might suggest that this benefits the Communist BEP bloc, this is not the case, first of all because Our Party takes votes away from BEP. Moreover, Usat\u00eei has historically been unfriendly to both Dodon and the old pro-Russian forces and has always tried to follow his own line. In the second round of the 2020 presidential election he spoke out against Dodon and thus informally supported Maia Sandu. In last year’s election he also did not express support for the left’s candidate, Stoianoglo, which was understood as soft, pragmatic support for Sandu.<\/p>\n

        Electorate<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        Polls suggested that this time Our Party would cross the 5% threshold and could win up to 12% of the vote. In the end Our Party won 6.2% of the vote and 6 seats. The party did better in B\u0103l\u021bi, the second largest city, and the neighbouring municipalities, where it won between 10 and 23%. In the diaspora Our Party was the second most popular party with 5.5% of the vote.<\/p>\n

        Campaign messages<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        In his last speech before the elections Usat\u00eei called on people “to vote for a strong Moldova in which European and world standards become reality. So that every citizen of the Republic of Moldova is protected and heard, so that everything that was sad in the history of the Republic of Moldova stays in the past and we take a new step towards prosperity and development. So that the Republic of Moldova as a state cares for every parent and every child the way I care for my parents and my children. It is important for us to preserve stability and unite society. Above all, to keep everything that is good and not let the country sink into chaos or destabilisation, or into something that would sadden at least half of the citizens. We will be the ones who erase the word ‘division’ from the vocabulary of Moldovan politicians. European and world standards must become reality, and more than that, we must become an example to other states of how to care for every citizen.”<\/em><\/p>\n

        The campaign<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

        During the campaign the party organised many personal meetings with Usat\u00eei, often staged gatherings of party activists and the leader in the street. Social media was dominated by Usat\u00eei’s statements on various topics.<\/p>\n

        During the campaign Usat\u00eei avoided sharp criticism of Sandu and PAS. Although he said that a coalition between Our Party and PAS was hardly possible, he refused to sign an official agreement with BEP and other parties pledging that Our Party would not enter a coalition with PAS. This shows a position of balancing between the two blocs.<\/p>\n

        Likewise, PAS did not actively criticise Our Party during the campaign. Usat\u00eei is looking towards the 2028 election, as he managed to take a strong third place in the last two.<\/p>\n

        Democracy at Home political party (PPDA)<\/strong><\/p>\n

        The small political party that surprised most in these elections. Not a single poll showed it entering Parliament. The party was founded in 2011. It is most often described as a populist, far right party. Its most important and prominent goal is the union of Moldova and Romania.<\/p>\n

        The party is very close to the Romanian opposition party Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), led by the radical right leader George Simion, who actively supported PPDA in these elections.<\/p>\n

        PPDA is led by Vasile Costiuc, a well known Moldovan activist and frequent organiser, participant and provocateur of various protests. The Moldovan press has previously reported on Costiuc’s close links with the oligarch and politician Vladimir Plahotniuc. There were suspicions that this oligarch was financing Costiuc and PPDA[1]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

        Since its founding the party had never entered Parliament, and its best result was in the 2021 elections (1.45%).<\/p>\n

        Although in the 2024 EU membership referendum Costiuc campaigned for a yes vote, in the same year he took part in a meeting of far right Eurosceptic parties in Chi\u0219in\u0103u. According to Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service, this meeting was organised by people linked to Shor’s criminal group. Representatives of pro-Russian parties from Moldova and EU countries took part.<\/p>\n

        During the campaign the party made active use of social media, especially TikTok, where Costiuc set out his critical views. A lot of disinformation and false information was recorded in these videos. Some of the claims were refuted by state institutions and independent journalists. Costiuc and PPDA are suspected of having taken part in a disinformation campaign[2]<\/a>. This is described in more detail in the fourth part of this analysis.<\/p>\n

        The National Inspectorate of Investigations asked Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission to investigate suspicions that PPDA used hundreds of fake TikTok accounts in its campaign[3]<\/a>. The account and videos of party leader Costiuc received hundreds of thousands of views. The TikTok strategy used by Costiuc was strikingly similar to the campaign strategy used by C\u0103lin Georgescu in the Romanian presidential election. Given that PPDA was also supported by George Simion, it can be assumed that the same illegitimate TikTok strategy as in the Romanian presidential election was used in the Moldovan elections to boost support for PPDA.<\/p>\n

        Analysts also note that the party’s success may have been helped by the exclusion from the elections of the far right, pro-Russian Greater Moldova party. The leader of that party was supported in last year’s presidential election by Ilan Shor and his criminal network. More and more information is gradually emerging that once Greater Moldova was excluded from the elections, the Shor network redirected its support mechanisms to PPDA.<\/p>\n

          \n
        1. Disinformation and Russian interference in Moldova’s elections<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          Russia’s goals and scenarios in these elections:<\/p>\n