On 7 May the United Kingdom (UK) held its annual local elections, which elected:<\/p>\n
These elections took place against the background of a changing and fragmenting UK electoral system. In 2024 the Labour Party won an almost record share of seats in Parliament (63 percent) with less than 34 percent of the vote, the lowest vote share ever recorded by a party winning a general election in the UK. It was this general election that marked a decisive moment in the fragmentation of the political system: the Conservative Party also recorded its worst result in history, while the smaller parties won record levels of support in votes but were still unable to turn them into seats under the majoritarian first-past-the-post system.<\/p>\n
For the past two years the traditional two party system of the Conservatives and Labour has been under pressure from all sides: from Reform UK on the right, the Green Party on the left, the Liberal Democrats in the centre, and the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru from the country’s geographical periphery.<\/p>\n
Before the local elections, support for the main parties had settled at the following levels (YouGov, 4 to 5 May):<\/p>\n
The latest seat projection using multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) (Electoral Calculus \/ Find Out Now, 27 March to 7 April) showed the following distribution of seats in Parliament (326 seats are needed for a majority):<\/p>\n
Although the projected redistribution of seats looks dramatic because of the very large swings, the real drama lies in the fragmentation of the political system: it is already hard to imagine the country’s political future without coalition building.<\/p>\n
Why has the UK political system fragmented?<\/strong><\/p>\n The main cause of the fragmentation is a compound economic, social and political crisis that has produced particularly strong dissatisfaction with the old political elite. This crisis can be traced back to the economic crisis of 2008, during which the quality of life of a large part of society deteriorated significantly. The relationship between wage growth and inflation illustrates this. Since 2008 the average wage in the UK has risen by about 52%, while cumulative inflation has been about 60%. By comparison, in Lithuania the average wage has risen by about 200%, while cumulative inflation has been about 80%. This means that although inflation in Lithuania was higher over this period, income growth was much more noticeable and faster, far outpacing price growth and significantly raising living standards. In the UK, by contrast, the last decades have been marked by stagnating or even declining living standards.<\/p>\n The Brexit referendum, tensions over Scottish independence, the COVID-19 pandemic, migration flows (especially after Brexit) and the recent shocks caused by wars and energy resources have all added to this compound crisis. Together they created perfect conditions for disillusionment with the dominant Conservative and Labour parties and for the rise of new populist forces promising to change the system.<\/p>\n Local election results in England<\/strong><\/p>\n Results of the local elections in England:<\/p>\n The share of seats won corresponds quite closely to the parties’ national poll ratings. Before the elections there was much talk that Labour<\/strong> would certainly suffer a defeat, the only question being how big. It was stressed that losing more than 1,500 councillors would be a very bad result for Labour. The party lost fewer, but this still amounts to almost 60% of the seats it was defending in this cycle. It is an exceptionally heavy defeat, yet not a “very bad” one, rather just a “bad” one. At least that is how the Labour leadership itself and many commentators present it.<\/p>\n Labour’s biggest losses were in the north of England, in former industrial regions that have been in decline for many years. For a long time these regions were considered Labour’s “red wall”, the party’s most important strongholds, yet it was here that support for Brexit was strongest. In 2019 it was here that Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party, with a strong pro-Brexit campaign, won a historic victory. By 2024, however, the north of England had returned to Labour, although Reform UK had already established itself there as the second party. In this cycle it was Reform UK that made its most significant breakthrough in the north of England, in some councils completely routing Labour.<\/p>\n Interestingly, Labour lost the most council seats to Reform UK, although it lost the most votes to the Green Party. This is a very typical Labour dilemma: when Reform UK polls above 30%, Labour slips below 30% because part of its electorate drifts to the Greens, who poll up to 20% and have almost doubled their support thanks to Labour’s left wing voters. This split of the vote helps Reform UK win narrow breakthroughs in areas once dominated by Labour.<\/p>\n Of course, Reform UK<\/strong> hurts the Conservative Party (and vice versa). The Conservatives were the first to bleed from the rise of Reform UK, losing almost half of their electorate. It is important to stress, however, that Reform UK does not draw votes only from the Conservatives: its electorate includes a significant share of former Labour voters and people who previously did not vote. Although last year the Conservative Party seemed to be falling at an unstoppable pace and about to be wiped out by the rise of Reform UK, in the second half of the year the party managed to stabilise the situation. This is attributed to the party’s strategic decision to engage less in values based culture war topics and to focus on the state of the economy. The turning point was a strong speech on economic reform by party leader Kemi Badenoch at the Conservative conference at the end of the year. Nevertheless, the party continues to suffer from internal tensions and a steady stream of defections to Reform UK, the most prominent being that of the party’s former number two, Robert Jenrick.<\/p>\n These elections were relatively good for the Conservatives, given that the complete collapse of the party had been predicted. Although they lost as much as 40% of the council seats they were defending in this cycle, the party held its ground in crucial London boroughs, won control of two new councils, Westminster and Wandsworth, and kept its majorities in other important councils it already held. The Conservative Party mostly lost seats on councils where it had no majority and no significant influence over local government, but held and strengthened its position where it was in the lead. There are exceptions, of course, but that is the overall trend. This smaller than expected defeat allowed Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch to declare after the elections that the Conservatives are back and starting to grow. This mood helps stabilise the situation within the party.<\/p>\n The Greens<\/strong> had high hopes, especially after winning first place in a parliamentary by-election a few weeks earlier. This gave the party and its new leader Zack Polanski visibility and a national profile. However, the party’s sharp rhetoric on international issues (antisemitic, pro-Palestinian and pro-Iranian rhetoric), while it helped consolidate the support of ethnic minorities and the far left, prevented the party from attracting voters in the political centre. The party performed very well in councils with large university campuses (thanks to the votes of young people and minorities) and significantly strengthened its position in London and other big cities. After the elections, however, it has been noted that the Green electorate is spread too evenly (too thinly) across the country for the party to achieve bigger wins in general elections and thus pose a more serious challenge to the other parties.<\/p>\n The Liberal Democrats<\/strong> are the only UK party that has grown in each of the last eight local election cycles. This time their growth came mostly in areas where the Lib Dems already controlled councils or were significantly strong. For example, on Richmond council in suburban London they won all 54 seats, pushing out even the Greens, who are strong in the area. This suggests that where the Lib Dems are stronger, residents are satisfied with their work. It should be noted, however, that the party has a distinctive strategy for both local and general elections: it rarely runs national campaigns and instead concentrates on target areas where it is strong or can achieve a breakthrough. This limits its national visibility and its chances of winning a general election, but allows it to keep a large and significant group in Parliament and strong support at the local level.<\/p>\n Election themes<\/strong><\/p>\n The 2026 UK local elections became much more than the usual contest over local services, planning or local taxes. They turned into a kind of national referendum on the first two years of the Labour government, the weakening of the traditional two party system and the rise of Reform UK as a new, structurally important political force with ambitions to form the next government.<\/p>\n Labour<\/strong> tried to base its campaign on a narrative of stability, responsible government and economic competence, emphasising cost of living issues and arguing that local councils would work more effectively in cooperation with a Labour national government. Voters, however, no longer judged the party as an opposition but as the government responsible for the current situation. This strengthened the criticism that Labour promised change but has so far governed too sluggishly, has been unable to improve living standards and lacks an emotional connection with the working class and the post-industrial regions where it suffered its heaviest defeats.<\/p>\n The main beneficiary of this situation was Reform UK<\/strong>, which turned the elections into a platform of protest against the political elite in London. The party, led by Nigel Farage, combined anti-establishment rhetoric, a hard line on immigration, economic populism, scepticism towards climate policy and a narrative of “ordinary people fighting the political class”. Importantly, Reform UK did not campaign like a traditional party of local government: it presented itself as a national movement ready to take power at the national level in the future. Local issues therefore received less attention, and the focus was entirely on national narratives. The party’s biggest gains came in regions that backed Brexit, in former Labour “red wall” areas and in economically weakened towns in the north of England. At the same time, the elections revealed growing political fragmentation: voters often voted not “for” a chosen party but “against” a disliked political force.<\/p>\n The Conservative Party<\/strong> faced perhaps the most difficult strategic problem: it tried to convey the idea of renewal under Kemi Badenoch while being forced to compete with Reform UK for culturally conservative voters who still have some attachment to the Conservative Party of previous parliaments that they voted for. Yet in many regions Reform UK looked like the more authentic protest and anti-establishment force.<\/p>\n The Liberal Democrats<\/strong> based their campaign on a message of moderation, pragmatism and “community politics”, presenting themselves as an alternative to both Labour centralisation and Reform UK populism.<\/p>\n The Green Party<\/strong> tried to link climate policy to everyday socioeconomic issues: energy prices, housing, public services and quality of life.<\/p>\n Scottish Parliament election<\/strong><\/p>\n Results of the Scottish Parliament election in seats (65 are needed for a majority):<\/p>\n Since 2007 the Scottish Parliament has been dominated by the Scottish National Party (SNP)<\/strong>, which seeks Scottish independence. Although the party can be considered a fairly typical nationalist or regionalist party, in economic and social terms it is on the left. The last parliamentary term was particularly difficult for the party. First of all, after the failed independence referendum a decade ago, the SNP is still searching for its identity, especially on the question of whether to seek a new independence referendum and, if so, how to do it when London blocks such ambitions.<\/p>\n The party was also shaken by a corruption scandal that forced its popular leader and Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, to resign. After her departure the party went through a very difficult leadership contest between competing visions for the party, as a result of which Humza Yousaf, who had little popularity and came from the party’s far left flank, became the new leader. His leadership was very chaotic and short, marked by attempts to drag the party into culture wars (for example, by seeking to make it easier to change legal gender in Scotland and by getting involved in the Israeli Palestinian conflict) and by infighting. Yousaf’s leadership ended in a conflict with the coalition partner, the Scottish Green Party, which led to the collapse of the coalition.<\/p>\n In the end Yousaf was replaced by the more experienced John Swinney, a former party leader and long serving minister. He is a far more moderate politician, well regarded for his competence, who brought the party back to the political centre and revived the moderate message that Scotland can again seek independence, but only through a civilised compromise with London.<\/p>\n Labour<\/strong> dominated Scotland until the rise of the SNP, and the region was considered a traditional stronghold of the left. The party lost its support precisely to the left leaning SNP. The SNP’s recent scandals had revived, at least briefly, Labour’s hopes of regaining control of Scotland, and these hopes were further boosted by the 2024 general election, in which Labour won the most seats in Scotland, taking them from the SNP. Over the last two elections, however, the situation has returned to a more familiar pattern.<\/p>\n These election results show trends very similar to those across the country. Labour and the Conservatives lost a significant number of seats, while Reform UK, the Greens and the Lib Dems are rising. Before the election some polls suggested that Reform UK could become the second party in Scotland, but Labour managed to hold its ground.<\/p>\n Reform UK<\/strong> rose at the expense of the Conservatives, who in the previous election cycle had achieved a historic result and become the leading opposition party in Scotland. This was linked to the wider victories of Boris Johnson’s Conservatives in pro-Brexit, working class, socially conservative former industrial regions of the north of England. These areas have now swung to Reform UK.<\/p>\n The Scottish Green Party<\/strong>, which like the SNP supports Scottish independence, also won a record number of seats. This strengthens its position in the coming coalition negotiations with the SNP and will probably, for the first time, give the party a chance not only to influence the direction of policy but also to hold real ministerial posts in a coalition with the SNP (in the previous coalition it held only two junior minister level posts).<\/p>\n Welsh Parliament election<\/strong><\/p>\n Results of the Welsh Parliament (Senedd) election in seats (49 are needed for a majority):<\/p>\n As in Scotland, Labour dominated Wales for many years. In Wales, which lags far behind Scotland in its aspirations for independence, Labour held on much longer, dominating every election without interruption for the past century. However, national unpopularity, the retirement of a long serving and popular leader and the corruption scandals that shook Welsh Labour became a decisive turning point for the party’s reputation.<\/p>\n Plaid Cymru<\/strong> is again a traditional nationalist party, campaigning for the use of the Welsh language, Welsh culture, Welsh autonomy and greater powers for local government. The party also leans to the left, but expresses these positions less strongly than the SNP and does not get involved in the topics of the cultural left.<\/p>\n The party has existed for more than a century, but gained greater influence after 1999, when the Welsh devolved parliament was established. Since then it has enjoyed fairly stable support from about a fifth of voters (around 13 seats). It has sometimes been in opposition and sometimes in coalition with Labour. The party’s stability, consistency and clear regional identity have allowed it to keep a loyal electorate even in periods when support for other traditional parties fluctuated sharply. In recent years the party has also successfully broadened its political programme beyond cultural and autonomy issues, giving increasing attention to health care, the cost of living, prices, housing and regional economic inequality. This has allowed Plaid Cymru to become an expression not only of Welsh nationalism but also of wider dissatisfaction with London’s policies, especially among younger and more progressive voters disillusioned with both the Conservatives and Labour.<\/p>\n Reform UK<\/strong> achieved an impressive second place in Wales, which voted strongly for Brexit. Some polls had even predicted a victory, but the new party failed to keep its momentum, and a scandal over a former local leader acting in Russia’s interests dealt it a heavy blow. Still, a strong second place gives it a significant position for the future. Reform UK took over a large share of the seats and votes of the Conservative Party, which had achieved a historic result in the previous cycle. This is a trend similar to that in the north of England and in Scotland.<\/p>\n Labour<\/strong> suffered a historic blow, falling to third place. Even its leader, Welsh First Minister Eluned Morgan, lost her seat in the Senedd. This puts the party in Wales in a very difficult position and adds to its overall national decline. Nevertheless, Plaid Cymru is likely to invite Labour into the governing coalition it is forming, as the two parties are used to working together. Independence sentiment in Wales is also less pronounced than in Scotland (support fluctuates between 25 and 35%), so the issue causes fewer tensions between the regional Plaid Cymru and the parties linked to London.<\/p>\n Plaid Cymru will certainly not work with Reform UK, which proposes abolishing the Welsh Parliament altogether and returning to centralised rule of Wales. Nor will it work with the Conservative Party, which holds similar, if somewhat milder, views on Welsh autonomy.<\/p>\n Questions after the elections<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Will Keir Starmer survive?<\/strong><\/p>\n Although Labour lost somewhat less than predicted, the chorus of voices calling on him to step down and make way for a more left wing prime minister is growing. This is one of the most important post-election topics. The prevailing view is that Starmer’s departure is only a matter of time, and the longer it is delayed, the greater the losses will be in the future.<\/p>\n 2. Has Reform UK reached its peak?<\/strong><\/p>\n It seems so. Last year the party’s rating exceeded 30%, while this year it has stabilised at around 25%. In last year’s local elections Reform UK won 40% of the seats contested, now only 30%. All trends suggest that the party has hit its ceiling, which means that its rise leads not to a Reform UK majority in the next Parliament but to a hung parliament requiring a coalition. Nevertheless, after the elections Reform UK leader Nigel Farage declared that people want, and the party is ready, to form a government after the next general election.<\/p>\n 3. Will Kemi Badenoch survive?<\/strong><\/p>\n After very bad results in this year’s elections, an internal revolt and a change of leadership had been predicted for the Conservative Party. However, the results were not as bad as forecast, and the party managed to present them as a victory and the beginning of a comeback. In addition, because of defections to Reform UK, the party no longer has prominent leaders of an internal opposition, above all Robert Jenrick. It is therefore likely that the situation will remain stable, at least this year.<\/p>\n 4. Will the Greens be able to grow their support?<\/strong><\/p>\n It seems that after last year’s growth, the Green Party and its leader Zack Polanski, like Reform UK, have reached their peak for now. This means that although the party is strengthening its position, it will be hard for it to win enough to come close to Reform UK. Adding to this is the fact that Green support is spread very thinly and evenly across the country. Because of this, the electoral system works against the Greens’ ambitions. Nevertheless, after the elections Zack Polanski repeated that the Green Party is the only alternative to Reform UK.<\/p>\n 5. Can the Liberal Democrats become a truly national party?<\/strong><\/p>\n Strange as it may seem, the Liberal Democrats now look like the most stable political force in the UK, steadily increasing their support. However, the party’s strategy and its focus on target constituencies prevent it from broadening its support and thus from hoping for more seats than it currently has. There is also growing criticism within the party of its leader Ed Davey, who, although he led the party to its current record result, is seen as the wrong leader if the party wants to become a national force. He is not particularly popular or well known, and to part of the public he seems too eccentric.<\/p>\n 6. Will a Progressive Alliance<\/em> be formed?<\/strong><\/p>\n In a first-past-the-post<\/em> electoral system, the biggest killer of parties is fragmentation. The FPTP system works well with two, or at most three, parties. When the system fragments, however, many parties emerge, and the results are highly disproportionate and often hard to predict. As a result, there is growing talk of the need to consolidate, which could take the form of pre-election alliances. Their logic is simple: in the constituencies where the parties are strongest, they agree not to stand candidates against each other, thereby consolidating their support. They also agree to work together after the election. One such possible alliance, often called “progressive”, could emerge between Labour and the Green Party. It would make real sense given the overlap of their electorates and the distribution of votes. However, forming such an alliance is complicated by the fact that Labour is in government and the Greens are in opposition. The Greens hold very radical positions, for example on Gaza, that are incompatible with Labour policy. Although such an alliance would be strategically logical, it is unlikely.<\/p>\n 7. Will there be an alliance between Reform UK and the Conservative Party?<\/strong><\/p>\n Its logic is the same as in the case of the Progressive Alliance. This alliance could be much more likely, as the split of the vote between the two parties is already pronounced and entrenched. Moreover, the parties’ programmes are similar. Still, personal issues could stand in the way of such an agreement: the harsh rhetoric towards each other and the defections of Conservative politicians to Farage’s camp. It is also unclear who would lead the alliance, since although Reform UK is ahead, the gap between the parties is not that large, and Badenoch is the official Leader of the Opposition. Most likely the parties will gradually move closer, leading to a coalition after the next election. This is also indicated by Badenoch’s support, expressed after these elections, for Conservative coalitions with Reform UK on local councils.<\/p>\n 8. Will there be a Scottish Welsh alliance?<\/strong><\/p>\n Although the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru do not stand candidates against each other, the leaders of the two parties, who will now be the First Ministers of their nations, met before the elections and agreed to cooperate. This means a common position in talks with London on autonomy, finance and the powers of their parliaments. Both parties are also forecast to do well in the next general election, where they could win most of the seats in their territories. This could create a bloc of about 60 seats in Parliament that would have significant influence if the next UK government lacked a majority and had to govern as a minority. Formally or informally, this alliance has the greatest chance of becoming a reality.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":1196,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_yoast_wpseo_title":"","_yoast_wpseo_metadesc":"A review of the 2026 UK local elections: results in England, Scotland and Wales and the fragmenting party landscape after two years of Labour government.","edi_partner":""},"analysis_type":[23],"class_list":["post-1389","analysis","type-analysis","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","analysis_type-analyses"],"acf":{"introduction_text":"","remote_url":"","pdf":null,"author":[336],"footnotes":null,"related":null},"yoast_head":"\n\n
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