

Hungarian Election 2026

Actors, Strategies, and Possible Scenarios

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Summary

- The 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections are expected to be the most competitive since 2010.
- The main contest is between Viktor Orbán's Fidesz and the new opposition force, Tisza, led by Péter Magyar, which has quickly emerged as a credible challenger.
- Polls in 2025–2026 indicate growing opposition support, with many independent surveys placing Tisza ahead, sometimes by over 10%. In recent weeks, Tisza has often polled at or above 50%, partly due to smaller parties withdrawing or failing to qualify.
- The outcome remains uncertain due to Hungary's mixed electoral system, where seat distribution depends heavily on single-member constituencies and geographic vote distribution - opposition support is concentrated in cities, while Fidesz is stronger in rural areas.
- This study presents four possible election scenarios.

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I. The Hungarian Electoral System

Understanding Hungary's electoral system is essential for interpreting the possible outcomes of the 2026 parliamentary elections. While polling data often receives the most attention in public debates, the institutional structure and unique mechanisms of the electoral system play a decisive role in determining how votes are converted into real parliamentary seats. As was mentioned earlier, Hungary uses a mixed electoral system. It combines elements of majoritarian and proportional representation. Because of this institutional design, even relatively small differences in constituency outcomes can significantly affect the outcome.

Structure of the Electoral System:

The Hungarian National Assembly consists of 199 members. These seats are elected through two separate mechanisms:

1. 106 seats are elected in single-member constituencies using a first-past-the-post system.
2. 93 seats are allocated through national party list using proportional representation.

Each voter can cast two votes: (1) one for a candidate in their local constituency and (2) one for a national party list. In the constituency tier, a first-past-the-post system is applied: the candidate who receives the most votes wins the seat, and no second round is organised. In the proportional tier, parties that surpass the 5% threshold are represented in parliament.

Despite a relatively clear system, there is one important element that distorts it and creates an advantage for the ruling Fidesz party - the vote compensation mechanism.

The Vote Compensation Mechanism

Hungary's electoral system includes a vote compensation mechanism that directly affects how proportional (list) seats are allocated.

The core idea is that votes which do not contribute to winning a constituency seat are not "wasted" but are instead transferred to the party's national list. These transferred votes are then added to the party's total in the proportional tier.

Two types of votes are included in this compensation process:

1. Votes cast for losing candidates in single-member constituencies.

2. Surplus votes of winning candidates - that is, all votes received beyond what was necessary to defeat the second-place candidate.

Both categories are aggregated at the national level and increase the party's list vote total, which is then used in allocating proportional seats.

Formally, the purpose of this mechanism is to compensate parties whose candidates lose in constituency races, thereby making the system more proportional. In practice, however, it also advantages larger parties. Parties that win many constituencies tend to accumulate substantial surplus votes, which are then transferred to the list tier. This creates a cumulative effect: success in single-member districts not only yields constituency seats but also boosts performance in the proportional allocation.

As a result, the interaction between constituency victories and vote compensation can produce outcomes where a party secures a disproportionately high share of parliamentary seats relative to its national vote share.

II. Electoral Advantages and Informal Practices

One of the most decisive points in this parliamentary election is gerrymandering. After the electoral reform adopted in 2011, Hungary was divided into 106 single-member constituencies with noticeable differences in size. For example, opposition support is mostly concentrated in urban areas, whereas most Fidesz support is in rural areas. As a result, votes are not equally weighted across the country and some reports have shown that specific districts can deviate by more than 10% ³, which creates concerns about system's fairness.

Moreover, the media environment has also been shaped a lot in the last decade. A large part of the Hungarian media landscape has become closely aligned with business actors that are connected to the governing elite. This does not mean that independent media does not exist, however, its reach is significantly more limited, especially it is seen in rural areas. That is why many voters are primarily exposed to narratives coming directly from the government.

In addition to institutional design, there are several other factors that play an important role in Hungarian elections. The first one is called "voter tourism" which

³ Politico. "Hungary's Unfair Election: Why Viktor Orbán Is So Hard to Beat". 2026.
<https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-unfair-election-viktor-orban/>

allows voters to register in constituencies even if they do not permanently reside there. This creates a possibility for voter relocation to more competitive districts, which may influence final outcomes in key battlegrounds. The second one is basically the extension of citizenship and voting rights to ethnic Hungarians living abroad. Since 2014, around 2 million Hungarians living in neighbouring countries have received the right to vote and eventually it has led to approximately 500 000 additional voters³. People who cast ballots in these territories have shown strong support for Fidesz in the past, with some estimates suggesting that support reaches up to 90 %. Meanwhile, participation among so-called emigré Hungarians (living further abroad) who are usually young people, have been remaining significantly low due to complicated voting procedures. Eventually, it creates an imbalance between “near-abroad” and emigré voters where the first group is eligible to vote by mail, while the second must rely on embassies. As a result, turnout differs significantly, reaching around 50% for near-abroad voters and 20-25% for emigré voters ³.

Finally, there are repeated allegations of vote-buying, particularly in regions that are economically vulnerable. Some reports describe situations where voters were offered small financial rewards or even goods in exchange for their support. Such practice is often referred to as “Krumpliosztás” ⁴ (potato distribution) and reflects claims that basic food supplies are distributed during the main campaign. For instance, in recent elections, observers reported offers of around 10,000 forints (approximately 25 euros) per vote.

III. Political Actors and Campaign Strategies

The 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election is largely defined by the competition between two main political forces. On one hand, the long-dominant governing coalition Fidesz-KDNP which is led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. On the other hand, emerging opposition party Tisza led by Péter Nagy. Although a few smaller parties are also participating in the election, the political battleground is framed as a direct confrontation between the two biggest players.

⁴ Zsófia Stavri, Global Informality Project. “Krumpliosztás (Hungary)”. 2026. https://www.informality.com/wiki/index.php?title=Krumplioszt%C3%A1s_%28Hungary%29



Fidesz-KDNP (Viktor Orbán)

The governing coalition of Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) has dominated Hungarian politics since 2010. During this period, Viktor Orbán's government secured repeated parliamentary majorities and implemented significant institutional and constitutional reforms. One of the key strengths of Fidesz is its highly developed party organization and strong local networks. For example, over the past decade, the party has built a stable electoral base, particularly in smaller towns and rural areas. These regions play a crucial role in parliamentary elections because many of Hungary's single-member constituencies are located outside major urban centres.

What is more, the campaign strategy that the party has been using lately is primarily focused on international affairs including topics such as national sovereignty, regional stability, and security issues. In the current election campaign, Viktor Orbán is noticeably bet everything on war in Ukraine⁵. For example, during some campaign speeches in early 2026, Orbán warned that Hungary must avoid becoming part of the war and said that the priority must be to "keep Hungary out of the war"⁶. Moreover, Fidesz members insist Magyar is "financed by Ukraine with the aim of installing a puppet government that will be loyal to Kyiv and Brussels"⁷. These narratives help to frame the election in terms of stability and national leadership, while presenting the government as an experienced actor that can protect from international crises.

⁵ The Guardian. "Orbán Seeks Votes by Attacking Ukraine". 2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/27/hungarys-viktor-orban-seeking-to-drum-up-votes-by-doing-down-ukraine>

⁶ Viktor Orbán. "We Must Stay Out of the War". 2026. <https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/we-must-stay-out-of-the-war/>

⁷ Politico. "Orbán, Magyar and Kremlin Smear Campaign in Hungary's Election". 2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-peter-magyar-kremlin-vladimir-putin-smear-blitz-in-hungary-election/>

At the same time, relations with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have been strained due to disagreements over energy policy and the minority rights of the Hungarians in western part of Ukraine. Hungarian officials have also criticized Ukrainian decisions affecting energy transit infrastructure, including most recent disputes related to the Druzhba oil pipeline that previously supplied Russian oil to Central Europe. It is pointed out that Viktor Orbán accused Kyiv of using energy transit as political pressure and stated that Hungary must prepare a strategy “to counter Ukrainian blackmail.”⁸

Hungarian Prime Minister has additionally maintained strong political ties with conservative leaders both in Europe and in the U.S. President Donald Trump, who praised him multiple times in the past, sees Orbán as a strong leader who protects national interests. Moreover, during a February visit to Budapest in 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly supported Orbán ahead of the parliamentary elections. Rubio stated that “President Trump is deeply committed to your success, because your success is our success”⁹. For the final stage of the campaign, Donald Trump sent US Vice President JD Vance to amplify MAGA’s endorsement of Viktor Orbán.

On the contrary, Orbán’s relations with many leaders in Brussels have been considerably more confrontational. One of the most visible disputes is the freezing of several billion euros in EU funds allocated to Hungary, which the European Commission suspended over concerns about judicial independence and corruption concerns. However, Hungarian officials have strongly criticized this decision, arguing that it creates political pressure from Brussels and threatens national sovereignty. Similar disputes help Orbán to portray EU institutions as interventionist and control seeking.

⁸ Hungarian Conservative. “Orbán: Ukraine Opened ‘Western-Directed Conflict’ Against Hungary”. 2026. <https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/orban-ukraine-druzhba-oil-blockade-hungary/>

⁹ Reuters. “Trump Committed to Hungarian PM Orbán’s Success, Says Rubio”. 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-committed-hungarian-pm-orbans-success-says-rubio-2026-02-16/>



TISZA (Péter Magyar)

As was mentioned previously, Péter Magyar's new party Tisza is the main challenger to the governing coalition. This party represents a political force that emerged only recently, however, it has managed to attract a lot of national attention. Magyar gained substantial visibility in Hungarian politics in 2024 when he publicly criticized the government and accused the political elite of constant corruption and abuse of power. His arguments became appealing to many people and statements with criticism such as "a country where a small political elite controls state institutions and public resources"¹⁰ highlighted the seriousness and readiness to fight for fundamental renewal of the political system.

Magyar's rise has been closely linked to his strong stance on corruption and the way institutions function. During campaign rallies and interviews, he repeatedly stressed that the central goal of his movement is to "restore the rule of law and rebuild trust in public institutions"¹¹. His speeches frequently refer to the need for transparency when it comes to public spending and stricter supervision of government contracts. Consequentially, the Tisza movement has gained support especially from urban population, younger generations, and middle-class which is politically dissatisfied. Large campaign events organised by Tisza in cities like Budapest, Szeged, and Debrecen have drawn thousands of participants. It clearly shows the growing mobilization capacity of the opposition.

In contrast to Orbán's focus on international conflicts and geopolitical issues, Magyar's campaign has mainly concentrated on domestic problems. His speeches frequently highlight themes like corruption, public services, and economic governance. For instance, Magyar has repeatedly criticized the state of healthcare system in

¹⁰ Foreign Policy. "Hungary's Election: Viktor Orbán Faces Challenger Péter Magyar". 2025. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/07/hungary-election-viktor-orban-peter-magyar-opposition-challenger>

¹¹ German Marshall Fund. "Hungary's 2026 Elections: Stakes and Challenges." 2025. <https://www.gmfus.org/event/hungarys-2026-elections-stakes-and-challenges>

Hungary. He argued that “Hungarian hospitals and schools are collapsing while political elites enrich themselves”¹². In addition, the reform about management of the EU funds was promised in the campaign. More precisely, unlocking frozen assets by Brussels, however, strengthened transparency and judicial independence must be achieved first. Bringing Hungary and EU partners closer is promised as well.

The major pushback to Tisza party is that it lacks large local network that Fidesz has built over more than a decade in power. This organisational gap may limit the party’s ability to compete effectively. Since all 106 single-member constituencies are being the most crucial electoral part of the system, Tisza might face challenges here.

IV. Constituencies: The Urban-Rural Divide

As was mentioned earlier, one of the most important structural characteristics of Hungarian elections is the urban-rural divide. Electoral results from recent parliamentary elections demonstrate a clear geographical polarization between major urban centres and smaller towns or rural regions. Generally, opposition parties perform significantly better in large cities (e.g. Tisza), while Fidesz holds much stronger support in the countryside.


Urban areas such as Budapest and several regional cities including Szeged and Pécs normally tend to demonstrate stronger support for opposition candidates. The rise of the Tisza movement has reinforced this trend, as Péter Magyar’s campaign messages about corruption, the worsening of public services, and economic mismanagement have strongly resonated with young and urban voters. Analysts note that Magyar’s criticism of the problems that citizens face every day, including the rise of living costs has allowed the movement to mobilize voters who had previously been less politically engaged.

Reports from towns such as Nyíregyháza in eastern Hungary suggest that younger voters are significantly more open to political change, while older voters often remain loyal to the governing party. One young voter which was interviewed during the campaign explained that he supported the Tisza movement because he believed the country was “heading in the wrong direction culturally and economically.” He also

¹² Telex. “Tisza Leads by 55-35 Among Decided Voters, Medián Poll Shows”. 2026. <https://telex.hu/english/2026/02/25/tisza-leads-by-55-35-among-decided-voters-with-a-big-lead-among-total-population-as-well-median-poll-shows>

noted that his mother and her friends would continue voting for Orbán largely because of the government’s message about the war in Ukraine and the need for stability ¹³.

In contrast, Fidesz has built serious political networks in small towns and rural districts regions, including close cooperation with local officials and political organizations. The narrative from the governing party emphasizes security, national sovereignty, and stability mostly in the context of the war in Ukraine. It has been particularly effective among older voters in rural areas. In towns closer to the Ukrainian border, campaign message highlights the risk of being drawn into the conflict and, as was observed, it has been influential among older residents. Moreover, Orbán has long portrayed himself as a politician with humble rural roots, frequently referencing his upbringing in the village of Felcsút and presenting himself as a leader who understands the concerns of people living outside metropolitan areas. This narrative also helps reinforce the perception among many rural voters.



Based on our analysis, the two parties target different types of constituencies, with overlap in the most competitive segments. TISZA, aiming for 68 seats, focuses primarily on urban and transitional areas: around 18 seats in Budapest, 15 in other urban constituencies, 15 in semi-urban areas (where the largest share of the

¹³ Associated Press. “A Youth-Led Push for Change Threatens Orbán’s 16-Year Rule”. 2026. <https://apnews.com/article/58e71836ef9e3a38bc478bdbde9ca0b0>

constituency is urban), and approximately 20 in semi-rural districts (where the majority of the constituency is rural but includes a populous urban centre). Its strategy is to maximise support in cities and in less stable, more competitive peripheral zones. Fidesz, targeting 73 seats, relies on a strong rural base, with about 38 seats in rural constituencies forming its core advantage, while also competing in semi-rural and semi-urban areas. As a result, the decisive battleground lies in the semi-urban and semi-rural constituencies, where both parties compete for roughly 35 seats and where the overall election outcome is likely to be determined.

As a result, opposition parties may achieve large vote margins in urban constituencies, but these victories transfer into a relatively limited number of parliamentary seats. Meanwhile, Fidesz can secure a larger number of seats by winning many rural constituencies with narrower margins. Political analysts frequently point out that opposition voters tend to be highly concentrated in large cities, which increases the number of proportional list votes but may still leave Fidesz with an advantage in constituency races.



V. Small Parties and the 5% Threshold

Although the upcoming 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election is primarily framed as a combat between the governing Fidesz-KDNP and TISZA, several smaller political parties may still influence the outcome. Their significance depends on whether a party can enter parliament through the proportional party-list system while, however only after passing the necessary electoral threshold.

Under Hungarian electoral law, political parties must receive at least 5% of the national vote to gain representation in the National Assembly. Parties that fail to reach this threshold do not receive any seats from the proportional list system. As a result, votes that were given for such parties are excluded from parliamentary seat allocation, which eventually benefit larger parties.

Current polling data suggests that Mi Hazánk Movement (Our Homeland Movement) is the most likely smaller party to cross the threshold. The party is generally described as a nationalist and far-right political movement and mostly focuses on issues such as national sovereignty, anti-immigration policies, and criticism of European Union influence. Several recent surveys estimate its support at around 5-7% of total number of voters. It places the MH just above the parliamentary entry requirement. At the same time, other smaller parties appear less likely to enter parliament. For example, polling data indicates that the centre-left Democratic Coalition (DK) and the satirical Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP) are polling at roughly 3-4%, which is below the required level.

Furthermore, the threshold creates a dilemma for voters who oppose the governing party. In simple words, supporting a smaller opposition party that fails to reach 5% might reduce the overall vote share of the opposition bloc, which indirectly strengthens the governing coalition. Several minor opposition parties such as Momentum Movement, Dialogue (The Greens' Party), Hungarian Socialist party and others have announced in recent months that they would not run independently. This decision was made after polls showed extremely low support around 1-3% of voters¹⁴. For this reason, some smaller parties have encouraged their supporters to vote for the larger TISZA movement in order to unify the opposition vote.



VI. Media Narratives, Propaganda, and Campaign Controversies

The 2026 Hungarian election campaign has been shaped not only by polling trends and party programmes, but also by a constant flow of controversies, emotional messaging, digital manipulation, and international narratives. In many ways, this has become one of the most media-driven Hungarian campaigns in recent years. The ruling Fidesz team is constantly trying to frame the election as a choice between “war

¹⁴ Publicus Institute. “Party Support – January 2025”. 2025.
<https://publicus.hu/blog/partok-tamogatottsaga-2025-januar/>

and peace”, whereas the opposition has tried to keep attention on domestic issues such as corruption, living standards, and institutional decline.

Russian interference and Moscow’s interest in an Orbán victory

One of the most serious concerns in this campaign is Russian interference in favour of Viktor Orbán. An orchestrated program backed by the Kremlin seeks to support Orbán’s re-election by spreading pro-Fidesz narratives and anti-opposition narrative through Hungarian influencers and disinformation channels. Russia’s Social Design Agency which has already been under Western sanctions, is working on messages that portray Orbán as a sovereign leader with powerful international allies. Meanwhile, his opponent Péter Magyar is presented as a weak figure controlled by Brussels. It is also reported that GRU ¹⁵ - linked operatives were present in Budapest and that the operation was specifically designed to appear domestic rather than openly Russia-connected ^{16 17}. However, Orbán’s government and the Russian embassy deny all the allegations. Additionally, Orbán has been maintaining close relations with Moscow which are even warmer than with most EU leaders. This connection has repeatedly created problems like delayed support to Ukraine and has also built a rhetoric that suit Russian interests.

Prisoners of war, ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine, and the anti-war narrative

Another unusual and politically sensitive topic is the issue of ethnic Hungarian prisoners of war from Ukraine. According to reports, Russia transferred two dual Hungarian-Ukrainian POWs ¹⁸ to Hungary after diplomatic contact involving Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and President Putin. It was condemned by Ukraine and seen as a provocation and a breach of humanitarian norms. There is also evidence that at least one former Ukrainian POW transferred from Russia to Hungary was later drawn into Orbán’s campaign environment. This case promotes narrative that Hungarians in western Ukraine are endangered by the war and that only Budapest can defend them.

The Magyar sex-tape scandal

¹⁵ Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (GRU).

¹⁶ VSquare. “GRU-Linked Election Fixers in Budapest”. 2026. <https://vsquare.org/putins-gru-linked-election-fixers-are-already-in-budapest-to-help-orban/>

¹⁷ Politico. “Orbán, Magyar and Kremlin Smear Campaign in Hungary’s Election”. 2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/vikto-orban-peter-magyar-kremlin-vladimir-putin-smear-blitz-in-hungary-election/>

¹⁸ Prisoner of War (POW): captured military personnel during armed conflict.

The most widely discussed campaign scandal was the leaked photo and video material allegedly involving Péter Magyar and his former partner Evelin Vogel ¹⁹. The material was published on 12 February 2026 and quickly spread across Hungarian media and social platforms. Both denied wrongdoing, however Vogel described the situation as political blackmail and Magyar said he had been deliberately set up. This scandal mattered in the campaign because it allowed to shortly shift attention away from Fidesz's vulnerabilities and Magyar was eventually forced onto the defensive for a short term. Interestingly, the opposition tried to turn the situation into proof that their rival is capable of using dirty methods in order to win.

Posters, AI images, and the visual war against Ukraine and Brussels

The visual side of the campaign has been especially aggressive. Fidesz and government-linked messaging have relied heavily on posters and flyers linking Péter Magyar, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ursula von der Leyen, and Manfred Weber together as one unfriendly political group. One of the most usable images in Budapest are campaign posters for the government's "National Petition". It explicitly displays AI generated portraits of von der Leyen, Zelenskyy ²⁰, and Weber together. Disinformation and other AI-generated images are purposefully targeting Zelenskyy as a negative figure. This makes campaign not just anti-opposition but rather tries to convince voters that domestic change would mean giving up to Ukraine and Brussels.

Orbán's claims that Ukrainians threatened him and his family

In March, Orbán released an emotional video where he claims that Ukrainians had threatened his children and grandchildren ²¹. This accusation came after provocative remarks made by a retired Ukrainian politician. It is reported that Orbán's government planned to release a security report that he said would show Ukraine supporting his political rival illegally. Although the evidence for those claims has not been publicly established, the situation has shown that Orbán is trying to personalize the conflict

¹⁹ Politis. "Hungary Election Rival Faces Leak of Intimate Video". 2026.
<https://en.politis.com.cy/globe/globe-europe/986200/hungary-election-rival-faces-leak-of-intimate-video>

²⁰ LRT. "Budapest Covered with Zelensky Posters". 2026.
<https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/2862527>

²¹ The Guardian. "Hungary's Orbán Claims Ukrainians 'Threatened' His Family as Election Campaign Ramps Up". 2026.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/12/orban-ukraine-claims-hungary-election>

and make it appear immediate, emotional, and family-related instead of just abstract or geopolitical.

TikTok, fake accounts, and digital interference

TikTok has become a very powerful tool for political campaign in recent years, and Hungarian example is not an exception. According to news article from Nepszava, TikTok removed a coordinated pro-government network in late 2025 involving about 95 accounts and roughly 131,000 followers. Later investigations also uncovered fake TikTok accounts impersonating opposition politicians and Tisza-linked MEPs ²². Some of those fake accounts tried to look pro-opposition in the beginning, but later begun posting coordinated controversial messaging, which aimed to create confusion among opposition supporters.

Simultaneously, the tone and general mood of the two main camps on TikTok have been very different. On one hand Orbán's TikTok communication is serious, security-focused, and dominated by anti-Ukraine and anti-Brussels rhetoric. On other hand, Péter Magyar's TikTok is more dynamic, colourful, movement-driven. It often uses trendy music, fast cuts, memes, and rally footage aimed at younger audiences. Although most Magyar's videos receive generally more views than Orbán's official account, it does not suggest that campaign online represents all age groups equally. In fact, on TikTok it has been historically easier to reach out younger audience and attract attention through fast, emotional, and shareable content.

AI-generated war video and fear as campaign strategy

Another controversial feature of the campaign has become the AI-generated war video ²³. Fidesz circulated an election video showing a fictional execution of a Hungarian soldier on a battlefield, implying that a Tisza victory could drag Hungary into war. The video reportedly showed a girl watching her blindfolded father being shot, and the message framed Fidesz as "the safe choice." Magyar called it a manipulative and immoral move. The government did not deny AI use.

The March 15 rally and the latest slogans

²² Nepszava. "TikTok and Fidesz Propaganda". 2026. <https://nepszava.hu/3308514>

²³ DW. "Orbán Uses AI Campaign Ads". 2026. <https://www.dw.com/en/orban-deploys-ai-made-scare-ads-as-hungarys-election-tightens/video-76159284>

The most recent rally that happened on March 15th in Budapest, illustrated again that Orbán framed the election as a choice saving the country or getting involved in the war. The rally was described as part of a nationalist, anti-Ukraine and anti-EU campaign. During the rally, posters and banners displayed messages such as “Hungary will not be a Ukrainian colony” and “Zelenskyy is not in charge here”²⁴.

Prediction markets and expectations

Beyond polls, election expectations are also visible in prediction markets. On Polymarket’s (the world biggest betting platform) Hungary election page²⁵, Tisza was at 65% in the “Hungary Parliamentary Election Winner” category, while the “Next Prime Minister of Hungary” market gave Péter Magyar 64%. The same page showed Tisza at 70% to win the popular vote. These numbers could be useful because they show where money-backed expectations currently lean.

VII. Possible Election Scenarios

Scenario A: Tisza majority and opposition-led government

This scenario assumes that Tisza converts its current momentum into a decisive electoral victory, capturing a large share of the remaining contested seats. Starting from a baseline of 78 guaranteed seats (45 proportional and 33 constituency), Tisza would expand to approximately 112-117 seats, including around 51 proportional and 66 constituency mandates. This implies strong performance not only in urban areas but also in competitive semi-urban and semi-rural districts. Fidesz, despite its stable base of 80 guaranteed seats (42 proportional and 38 constituency), would only reach around 82-87 seats (42 proportional, 40 constituency). Under these conditions, Tisza secures a clear parliamentary majority and forms a government, with capacity to pursue some institutional reforms and shift Hungary’s political direction.

Scenario B: Fidesz majority through constituency dominance

This scenario reflects a situation in which the national vote remains competitive, but Fidesz successfully translates its territorial advantage into constituency victories.

²⁴ Justin Spike. “Viktor Orbán and Rival Péter Magyar Rally Supporters in Budapest Before Hungary’s Election”. Associated Press, 2026.

<https://apnews.com/article/hungary-orban-magyar-rival-rallies-election-d9802379bae4d314463d9b80dacea950>

²⁵ Polymarket. “Hungary Parliamentary Election Winner”. 2026.

<https://polymarket.com/event/hungarian-parliamentary-election>. Accessed March 15, 2026.

Building on its 80 guaranteed seats, Fidesz would win a substantial share of the 35 contested constituencies, increasing its total to around 103-108 seats (45 proportional and 63 constituency). Tisza, while maintaining a strong national performance, would reach only 91-96 seats (48 proportional, 43 constituency). The outcome is driven by Fidesz's dominance in rural and small-town districts, combined with the vote compensation mechanism, which amplifies its gains through surplus votes. This allows Viktor Orbán to retain power despite a close overall vote distribution.

Scenario C: Tisza majority with Mi Hazánk entering parliament

In this scenario, the far-right Mi Hazánk crosses the 5% threshold and enters parliament with approximately 6 seats, all from the proportional tier. Despite this fragmentation, Tisza still achieves a majority by securing 109-114 seats (48 proportional, 66 constituency), indicating strong performance in contested districts. Fidesz would fall to around 79-84 seats (39 proportional, 40 constituency), partly due to vote losses to Mi Hazánk and weaker performance in competitive constituencies. Although a third party enters parliament, it does not prevent a Tisza-led government, as the opposition maintains a clear numerical advantage.

Scenario D: Hung parliament with Mi Hazánk as kingmaker

This scenario produces a highly competitive outcome in which neither Tisza nor Fidesz secures a majority. Tisza would obtain around 95-99 seats (48 proportional, 51 constituency), while Fidesz would reach approximately 94-98 seats (39 proportional, 55 constituency). Mi Hazánk enters parliament with about 6 proportional seats, becoming pivotal in coalition formation. With both major parties falling short of the 100-seat threshold, Mi Hazánk gains a decisive role and could enable a governing coalition. The most plausible outcome in this configuration is a Fidesz-Mi Hazánk alliance, which would surpass the majority threshold and allow Viktor Orbán to remain in power.

VIII. Conclusion

The 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections represent one of the most competitive political events in the country since Viktor Orbán's return to power in 2010. While recent polling data suggests victory for the opposition Tisza movement, the final result might shift due to the specific structure of electoral system in Hungary. The dominance of single-member constituencies, the vote compensation mechanism, and the strong urban-rural political divide mean that national vote shares are not always directly translated into parliamentary seats.

The campaign itself has become increasingly influenced by international tensions, AI use, and media controversies. Whether Hungary experiences a political transition under Péter Magyar, the continuation of Viktor Orbán's leadership, or a fragmented parliament will depend largely on how effectively each political force converts national support into constituency victories. These 2026 elections will not only determine the next Hungarian government but will also serve as an important test of how institutional rules, electoral geography, and modern campaign strategies shape political outcomes in contemporary Hungary.

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